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INTRODUCTION
This Essay addresses a new economic and human right the European Union has included in a Draft Regulation1 that would bind all its
Member States: the right to data portability (“RDP”). 2 The basic idea
of the RDP is that an individual would be able to transfer his or her
personal data and other material from one information service to another without hindrance. 3 A core example, referenced in the explanatory materials to the Draft Regulation, is for consumers to control
the material they have posted to a social networking site such as Face-

1. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and On the Free Movement
of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 18, at 53, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25,
2012) [hereinafter “Draft Regulation”].
2. Id.
3. Id.
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book. 4 In this example, the right would require it to be easy for users
to transfer their photos, videos, and status updates to another social
networking site. 5
We emphasize at the outset that the idea of data portability is appealing. 6 As consumers, we like the convenience of easily moving all
of “our” stuff to a new service if we so choose. 7 The RDP as defined in
Article 18 of the Draft Regulation, however, is unprecedented and
problematic. The new RDP provides the user (called the “data subject” under E.U. law) 8 the right to obtain data “in an electronic and
structured format which is commonly used and allows for further use
by the data subject.” 9 Article 18, in many settings, also requires information in an automated processing system to be transferred “in an
electronic format which is commonly used, without hindrance” from
the entity operating the system directly to another entity. 10 We introduce the term “export-import module” (“EIM”) to highlight the unprecedented nature of the RDP. 11 As drafted, Article 18 often requires an online service to write specialized code (the EIM) that will
export the data from that service and import it into a second service. 12
The text of Article 18 is in no way limited to social networks; its lan-

4. Id. at 26.
5. Id. Even in the absence of legal requirements, Facebook has now provided a tool
to enable consumers to download all of their data in a single computer file. Matthew Rogers, Facebook to Allow Users to Download Their Data, SWITCHED DOWNLOADSQUAD (Oct. 7,
2010, 4:40 AM), http://downloadsquad.switched.com/2010/10/07/facebook-to-allowusers-to-download-their-data/.
6. See, e.g., Vision & Mission, DATAPORTABILITY PROJECT (Mar. 19, 2009), http://wiki.
dataportability.org/pages/viewpage.action;jsessionid=2EDEAF2341B315BA17520E6301ED
C4E9?pageId=3440714 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012) (explaining the convenience of data
portability).
7. Id.
8. This Essay will use the terms “user,” “consumer,” and “data subject” interchangeably.
9. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53.
10. Id. art. 18(2), at 53.
11. See discussion infra Parts I.B.1, II–IV.
12. See Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53 (giving data subjects the right
to obtain their data in a commonly used format).
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guage applies generally to cloud computing, web services,
smartphone apps, and other automated data processing systems. 13
More generally, data portability can address a “lock-in” or high
switching costs problem—users start to use one service, such as Facebook, and then find it costly or technically difficult to shift to another
service, even if they prefer the other service. 14 One rationale for a legal right to portability in such instances would be to reduce monopoly
power and improve competition in the market, so that new services
can innovate and attract customers away from the original service. 15
Within E.U. law, an important additional rationale for the RDP is to
implement human rights related to privacy (generally called “data
protection” in the E.U.). 16 The drafters of the RDP justify it as building on fundamental data protection rights included in earlier European legal instruments, such as the 1995 Data Protection Directive. 17
Proponents would include the new rights created by the Draft Regulation as fundamental rights under E.U. law. 18 In addition to competition law and fundamental rights, interoperability is an additional possible argument in favor of Article 18.
While we underscore our hope that major online services will
provide data portability in many settings, we nonetheless write this Essay to express serious concerns about the RDP as drafted. A principal
reason for our concern is that Article 18 is a bad fit with U.S. antitrust
and E.U. competition law. 19 The concerns about lock-in and high
switching costs have been extensively addressed in antitrust law. 20
One crucial requirement in competition law is that market domi-

13. See Gabriela Zanfir, The Right to Data Portability in the Context of the EU Data Protection
Reform, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 149, 149 (2012) (discussing Article 18’s application to
cloud computing).
14. Id. at 152.
15. Id.
16. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, at 1–2.
17. Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 12, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 42 (EC) [hereinafter
Council Directive 95/46/EC]; see also Draft Regulation, supra note 1 (noting the 1995 directive and recognizing that further initiatives might be necessary).
18. Zanfir, supra note 13, at 151.
19. See infra Part II.
20. ANDREJ

FATUR,

EU

COMPETITION

LAW

AND

THE

INFORMATION

AND

COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY NETWORK INDUSTRIES: ECONOMIC VERSUS LEGAL
CONCEPTS IN PURSUIT OF (CONSUMER) WELFARE 86–87 (2012).
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nance must be shown, typically by demonstrating high market share.21
The text of Article 18, however, applies to a start-up software company
in a garage just as it does to a monopolist. In examining the best
means to achieve the goal of consumer welfare, the U.S. and the E.U.
have a nuanced application of the rule of reason, not the per se requirements of Article 18. 22 Competition law, not Article 18, would
consider the many efficiencies that result from a service provider deciding what functions to include in its products, which undergo rapid
innovation. 23
Another concern is that Article 18 suffers from serious difficulties
regarding privacy or data protection law. 24 No jurisdiction has experimented with anything resembling the proposed Article 18, casting serious doubt on its status as a new human right protecting privacy. 25
Among other difficulties, Article 18 poses serious risks to a longestablished E.U. fundamental right of data protection: the right to security of a person’s data. 26 Previous access requests by individuals
were limited in scope and format. 27 By contrast, when an individual’s
lifetime of data must be exported “without hindrance,” one moment
of identity fraud can turn into a lifetime breach of personal data. 28
A final concern with Article 18 is that the affirmative mandate to
create an EIM goes far beyond previous law relating to interoperability, in both the U.S. and E.U., where the second service is permitted
to write interoperable code, despite objections by the first service. 29

21. Id. at 247.
22. See, e.g., id. at 162; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (noting that the rule of reason is better suited to an appropriate balancing of benefits and costs than a per se rule).
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See infra Part III.B.
28. See infra Part III.C.
29. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d,
516 U.S. 233 (1996) (explaining that a method of operation, or the way a system is used,
can be employed and explained by other users in their own words, and is thus “uncopyrightable”); Council Directive 91/250/EEC, art. 6, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 45 [hereinafter
Council Directive 91/250/EEC] (stating that permission from the first service need not be
sought when it is necessary to reproduce and translate code to achieve interoperability);
Case C-406/10, SAS Inst. Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 2011 E.C.R. I-13, ¶ 61 (finding
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The new, mandated code must also perform at a high level of interoperability, transferring the data “without hindrance.” 30 In practice, achieving interoperability is often a difficult task, requiring tailored code to interact with different recipients. 31 But the RDP puts a
new obligation on the first service to write the EIM and meet that ambitious standard. 32
Part I of the Article explains the RDP as contained in the Draft
Data Protection Regulation issued by the European Commission in
January, 2012. The RDP would apply both within the E.U. and to
online services globally that sell in the E.U.33 Part II analyzes the RDP
under antitrust or competition law. A key finding is that the RDP, designed to help consumers, appears to reduce consumer welfare as understood in competition law. Competition law, in both the U.S. and
E.U., recognizes important efficiencies that can occur from lock-in for
some situations; notably, a certain level of switching costs can encourage investment in new products and services, creating efficiency over
time. 34 In addition, the Draft Regulation as written can reduce interoperability by creating an incentive to use non-standard formats;
only “standard and commonly used” formats trigger the RDP requirements. 35
Part III analyzes the RDP as an expansion of human rights from a
data protection and privacy perspective. With the absence of previous
experimentation with data portability rules, and no consensus among
experts about best practices, it is risky to lock in sweeping new requirements. 36 Part IV examines the RDP in light of other interoperability law, including Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International37

that the “functionality of a computer program reproduced in another computer program”
is not a copyright violation).
30. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53.
31. Rajiv Shah & Jay P. Kesan, Lost in Translation: Interoperability Issues for Open Standards, 8 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y 113, 113 (2012).
32. See infra Part IV.
33. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(2), at 41.
34. See FATUR, supra note 20, at 176 (“[T]he core issue with regard to imposing a duty
to deal is balancing short-run gains in efficiency with long-run incentives to invest and
compete dynamically, which should be done on a case-by-case basis.”).
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. See infra Part III.B.
37. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
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and the E.U. Computer Programs Directive, 38 and shows that the proposed RDP goes considerably beyond previous interoperability requirements. 39 The general conclusion is that the RDP deserves careful attention from academics and policymakers, both within the E.U.
and elsewhere, and that a sweeping or badly implemented version of
the RDP could cause significant harm.
I. ARTICLE 18: THE RIGHT TO DATA PORTABILITY
This Part examines the text of Article 18, which defines the RDP.
Three examples then illustrate the sorts of interpretive challenges facing the Commission and the many software and Internet service companies that would be required to comply with the RDP.
A. The Text of Article 18
The European Commission on January 25, 2012 proposed
changes to the current regulatory framework protecting the personal
data of individuals (the “Draft Regulation”). 40 Among those protections is the RDP. 41 This Essay is concerned with Article 18’s requirements on companies to transfer consumer data. 42 More specifically,
the Commission’s example of transfer of data between social networks
illustrates the goal of the RDP. The Draft Regulation cites the example of a social network as a rationale for Article 18: “The data subject
should . . . be allowed to transmit those data, which they have provided, from one automated application, such as a social network, into
another one.” 43 For this core example, a Facebook user would have
the right to export the data governed by Article 18 to the user or another social network.

38. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 17.
39. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815–16 (holding that a program’s menu command hierarchy
was not subject to copyright, even though programmers may have made some expressive
choices in developing the menu functions); Council Directive 91/250/EEC, supra note 29
(stating that the original programmer’s permission is not needed when reproducing or
translating code is necessary for interoperability).
40. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, at 1.
41. Id. art. 18, at 53.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 26.
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Article 18 is divided into three parts. Paragraph 1 gives consumers the right to download personal data, 44 which is defined broadly
under E.U. law as “any information relating to a data subject.” 45 The
right applies to personal data “processed by electronic means and in a
structured and commonly used format.” 46 For this personal data,
which we will refer to as “covered personal data,” the organization
that controls the data, such as the social network, must provide a copy
of the covered data to the data subject. 47 The copy must be “in an
electronic and structured format which is commonly used and allows
for further use by the data subject.” 48 In short, the user (called the
“data subject” under E.U. law) has a right of data portability—a right
to get a copy of the covered data in an easy-to-use format. For instance, a Facebook user would have a legal right to export his or her
covered data in a form that is usable in another social network. 49
Paragraph 2 gives consumers the right to transfer personal data
and “other information” provided by the consumer in a commonly
used format “without hindrance” from one processing system to another. 50 This paragraph differs in four important respects from Para-

44. Id. art. 18(1), at 53. Paragraph 1 states in full:
The data subject shall have the right, where personal data are processed by electronic means and in a structured and commonly used format, to obtain from the
controller a copy of data undergoing processing in an electronic and structured
format which is commonly used and allows for further use by the data subject.
Id.
45. Id. art. 4(2), at 41; see also Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1873
(2011) (“[T]he European Union takes an expansionist approach to [personally identifiable information].”).
46. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 5.
50. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53. Paragraph 2 states in full:
Where the data subject has provided the personal data and the processing is
based on consent or on a contract, the data subject shall have the right to transmit those personal data and any other information provided by the data subject
and retained by an automated processing system, into another one, in an electronic format which is commonly used, without hindrance from the controller
from whom the personal data are withdrawn.
Id.
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graph 1. First, it goes beyond the requirement to provide data to the
data subject. It requires the first party, such as Facebook, to export
the data directly to other websites, such as another social network. 51
Second, it requires data transfer to another processing system in a
commonly used format “without hindrance.” 52 Although the term
“without hindrance” is not further defined in the Draft Regulation,
the language suggests a strong obligation on the first party to have the
export work smoothly. Third, Paragraph 2 extends not only to “personal data” but also to “other information” provided by the user.53
Fourth, Paragraph 2 does not limit itself to data already stored in “a
structured and commonly used format,” as does Paragraph 1. 54 The
right to export data applies to “any other information provided by the
data subject.” 55
To further define the obligations of Article 18, Paragraph 3 vests
considerable power in the Commission to determine the scope of Article 18. 56 We are not aware of any legislation in effect that implements anything like Article 18. Given that the Draft Regulation uses
terms new to legislation, there is considerable uncertainty about the
meaning of the RDP as defined in Article 18.
B. Defining Key Terms in Article 18
The novelty of Article 18, and the varying interpretations that can
be given to its key terms, makes it difficult to gauge how broadly or
narrowly the text will be interpreted. This Essay critically examines
the possible rationales for and effects of Article 18. If Article 18 is interpreted broadly and enforced vigorously, then we believe there
could be quite substantial effects on online software and services. Notably, as discussed in Part II, the current text of Article 18 can be in-

51. Compare id. art. 18(1), at 53, with id. art. 18(2), at 53.
52. Id. art. 18(2), at 53.
53. Id.
54. Compare id. art. 18(1), at 53, with id. art. 18(2), at 53.
55. Id. art. 18(2), at 53.
56. Id. art. 18(3), at 53. Paragraph 3 states in full:
The Commission may specify the electronic format referred to in paragraph 1
and the technical standards, modalities and procedures for the transmission of
personal data pursuant to paragraph 2.

Those implementing acts shall be

adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article
87(2).
Id.
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terpreted to be substantially at variance with how E.U. competition
law assesses similar practices. By contrast, a narrow interpretation of
Article 18, or decisions by data protection authorities not to enforce
vigorously, would mean that the RDP creates few new issues—it would
not be a major departure from the status quo.
We hope readers will understand this Essay as a useful attempt to
analyze both the theoretical and practical implications of the innovative provisions of Article 18. The issues raised here may be helpful in
considering whether to amend the current text of Article 18 before
the Draft Regulation becomes final. The analysis may also be useful
to the Commission and interested persons in subsequent proceedings
under the authority delegated by Paragraph 3. 57 We now turn to the
possible narrow and broad interpretations of three key terms: (1)
“without hindrance”; (2) “other information”; and (3) “structured
and commonly used format.” 58
1. Export “Without Hindrance” and the Requirement to Write an
Export-Import Module
Under Paragraph 2, users have the right to transfer their data
“without hindrance” to the data subject or another online service. 59
Interpretation of “without hindrance” will substantially determine the
reach of Article 18. Quite possibly, under a broad reading that seems
supported by the text, Article 18 requires an online service to write
what we refer to as an “export-import module” (“EIM”). The EIM
signifies the software code and services that will export the data from
the first service and import it into a second service. The EIM software
that works “without hindrance” would presumably meet the European
e-Government initiative’s definition of “interoperability,” or “the ability of information and communication technology (ICT) systems . . .
to exchange data and enable the sharing of information and
knowledge.” 60 A strong form of interoperability would enable consumers to transfer data seamlessly from one platform to another.61

57. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(3), at 53.
58. Id. art. 18, at 53.
59. Id. art. 18(2), at 53.
60. Interoperability, IDABC EUROPEAN EGOVERNMENT SERVICES, http://ec.europa.eu/
idabc/en/chapter/5883.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
61. See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HIGHLY
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 23–24 (2012) [hereinafter PALFREY & GASSER, INTEROP] (discussing the seamless transfer of information). Palfrey and Gasser emphasize downsides as
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Such interoperability, however, is not free, and all consumer online
services operating in the E.U. would apparently need to develop an
EIM.
Under a narrower interpretation of “without hindrance,” the
RDP would not place an affirmative obligation on the controlling
website to transfer data directly to data subjects and other websites including competitors. Instead, the RDP would primarily seek to prevent a first party from technically blocking the transfer of data to a
second party. This interpretation would reduce the cost on the first
party because it would not need to develop an EIM to transport data
to competitors. The text of Article 18, however, may not be consistent
with this narrow reading. The language appears to impose an affirmative obligation on the first party to provide software that accomplishes the goal of exporting the data easily for the data subject.
2. Defining “Structured and Commonly Used Formats”
The right to data portability in Paragraph 1 applies only to data
“processed by electronic means and in a structured and commonly
used format.” 62 The Commission is specifically granted the authority
to define what formats meet this definition. 63 “Structured” and
“commonly used” are apparently two distinct formatting requirements
and both must be satisfied before consumers can realize their right to
data portability.
Structured data formats allow for increased functionality and easier data transfer. 64 Tim Berners-Lee is one advocate for greater use of

well as upsides of interoperability. We note that we received this book only after the ideas
in this Essay were mostly developed and presented publicly, although we did read and
benefit from the following article while developing this Essay: Urs Gasser & John Palfrey,
Breaking Down Digital Barriers: When and How ICT Interoperability Drives Innovation, THE
BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (2007) [hereinafter Gasser & Palfrey, Breaking
Down], available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interop-breaking-barriers.
pdf.
62. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53. Paragraph 3 specifically grants
the Commission the power to define what counts as the “structured and commonly used
formats” covered by Paragraph 1. Id. art. 18(3), at 53. The absence of a cross-reference to
Paragraph 2 supports the view that Paragraph 2 applies and its reference to “other information” is not limited to “structured and commonly used formats.” Id. art. 18, at 53.
63. Id. art. 18(3), at 53.
64. See Adam Cheyer & Joshua Levy, A Collaborative Programming Environment for Web
Interoperability, SRI INT’L ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CTR., http://www.ai.sri.com/pubs/files
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structured data formats. He supports the idea of a semantic web, or a
“World Wide Web that enables people to share content beyond the
boundaries of applications and websites.” 65 To achieve the semantic
web, websites would convert from using unstructured formats such as
PDF, where words, data, and pictures all appear essentially as one image on a page; instead, websites would rely on structured formats such
as RDL/XML, so that statistical and other information is exported to
a new service in a way that allows automatic processing. 66 Currently,
there is no easy tool for determining what formats count as structured. The standard-setting goals of the Internet Engineering Task
Force, for instance, do not include a structured format. 67 The Commission will thus have to develop the expertise to determine over time
which formats are sufficiently structured.
Once the Commission decides that a format is structured, it must
still determine whether a format is commonly used. 68 A structured
format is not necessarily commonly used—there are many standards
that are not widely adopted. 69 The difficulty of finding the actual usage of a format will further complicate the Commission’s task. It may
be difficult enough for the Commission to assess the number of sales
of a software package or downloads from a site. It is even more diffi-

/1272.pdf (describing the need to convert unstructured data formats into more structured
formats to enhance interoperability).
65. Main Page, SEMANTICWEB.ORG, http://semanticweb.org/wiki/Main_Page (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) (emphasis omitted).
66. See

W3C

Semantic

Web

Frequently

Asked

Questions,

SEMANTICWEB.ORG,

http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/SW-FAQ#Manual (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (explaining that
a goal of the Semantic Web is to convert existing internet data into one common form, in
this case RDF); How Do PDF Files Work?, NUANCE, http://www.nuance.com/imaging/
resources/userGuides/pdfconverter/chapter5/ch5_6.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (“PDF
documents present their pages as images.”); see also Introduction to RDF, W3SCHOOLS.COM,
http://www.w3schools.com/rdf/rdf_intro.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) (explaining that
RDF/XML information can be easily exchanged between different computers running
different operating systems and application languages).
67. See The IETF Standards Process, THE INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE, http://www.ietf.
org/about/standards-process.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) (“The goals of the Internet
Standards Process are: technical excellence; prior implementation and testing; clear, concise, and easily understood documentation; openness and fairness; and timeliness.”).
68. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(3), at 53.
69. For example, the IETF standard setting process does not include a widely adopted
requirement. See supra note 67.
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cult to measure the extent to which consumers actually use the format. 70
3. The Amount of Data Covered by the RDP
Defining what data is covered by the RDP is vital for organizations that must comply with portability requests. An area of uncertainty in the Draft Regulation is the definition of “other information
provided by the data subject” in Paragraph 2. 71
Website controllers maintain numerous types of data on consumers. On the one end, consumers directly upload data to a web
service. Examples include uploaded photos and information a user
has typed into a site, such as status updates or profile information. 72
Direct uploads, where users supply the information, presumably fall
within the definition of “other information.” 73 On the other end,
companies keep many kinds of metadata and analytics about usage of
a website, some of which is aggregated to the point where there is no
feasible link back to the individual user. 74 Data that is truly created by
the site, for operational or analytic purposes, presumably does not fall
within the definition of “other information provided by the data subject.” 75
Between the two ends lies a continuum with no natural line of
demarcation. A large portion of the data on the Internet comes from
a combination of the consumer and the controller’s website. Face-

70. See, e.g., Josh Catone, Google Docs Use: Just a Blip, SITEPOINT (Nov. 15, 2008),
http://www.sitepoint.com/google-docs-use-just-a-blip/ (discussing how “58% of unique
visitors to Google Docs and Spreadsheets in September 2008 never actually touched the
applications themselves”).
71. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53.
72. See, e.g., Downloading Your Information, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help
/?page=116481065103985 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012) (discussing the different types of data
consumers can already download from Facebook).
73. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53.
74. See

How

to

Prepare

Your

Organization

for

the

Metadata

Era,

VARONIS,

www.varonis.com/pdfs/howtoprepare-metadata-era.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) (noting
that organizations that store data often break that data in “containers” or “folders” that
can contain data from dozens of users). Metadata is generally defined as data about data
and is used by technology companies to manage data: “[W]e need metadata that will help
us determine, for example, who it belongs to, [who] has access to it, who uses it, and what
kind of content it contains.” Id.
75. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53.
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book’s friend list provides an example of this middle area. 76 Users
choose their Facebook friends, but Facebook may have a wide range
of related data, such as current friends, close friends, acquaintances
pending requests for friendship, declined friendship requests, and
“defriended” friends. 77 An online game such as World of Warcraft
provides another example. 78 Consumers develop individualized avatars that embark on unique quests, but such creations are done using
World of Warcraft software. 79 If the avatars in the game meet the other requirements for the RDP, then it may be a complex task to determine what information was “provided by the data subject.” 80 Somehow, the legal implementation of Article 18 will need to provide
guidance on how to handle the nuanced issues regarding information
that is provided at least in part by both the data subject and the controller, apparently for a huge number of different websites and apps.
Article 18 also fails to address how the RDP would apply in connection with intellectual property rights or claims by multiple individuals to have control over information. The RDP’s requirement to
export “other information” may conflict, for instance, with a license
that limits the data subject from copying songs, photographs, or other
content. Internet services themselves may have intellectual property
and similar restrictions on what may be downloaded. Facebook, for
example, restricts users from downloading any information “which is
a trade secret or intellectual property of Facebook Ireland Limited or
its licensors.” 81 More generally, multiple individuals may have “other
information” about them, such as when multiple people appear in a
photograph. Allowing one user to transfer a second user’s information may violate the privacy rights of the second user. 82 Controlling
websites may thus find it difficult to determine what “other infor-

76. See Lists for Friends, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/friends/lists (last
visited Nov. 12, 2012) (describing the way friends lists can be further subdivided by Facebook users).
77. Id.
78. WORLD OF WARCRAFT, http://us.battle.net/wow/en/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
79. What Is World of Warcraft?, WORLD OF WARCRAFT, http://us.battle.net/wow/en/
game/guide/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
80. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53.
81. Emil Protalinsk, Facebook: Releasing Your Personal Data Reveals Our Trade Secrets,
ZDNET (Oct. 12, 2011, 11:27 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebookreleasing-your-personal-data-reveals-our-trade-secrets/4552.
82. Thanks to James Grimmelmann who expressed this idea to Tal Zarsky.
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mation” may legally be transferred on behalf of a particular data subject.
The discussion here has presented three examples of as-yet undefined terms under Article 18: “without hindrance”, “structured and
commonly used format[s]”, and “other information provided by the
data subject.” 83 Experience with Article 18 may reveal other textual
challenges. As with any legal regime based on novel terms, there
would appear to be a great deal of uncertainty about how the full
range of software and Internet service providers are expected to comply with the RDP. Perhaps most importantly, controllers will need
guidance on the scope of the new mandate for them to write the software for the Export-Import Module. 84 The Draft Regulation also contains enhanced penalties that can reach two percent of a company’s
global revenue. 85 The prospect of large penalties, combined with
genuine uncertainty about the RDP’s meaning, makes it important to
scrutinize the proposed RDP carefully. The rest of this Essay will explore the problems that can arise from a broad interpretation of the
RDP.
II. THE RDP AND COMPETITION LAW
A core argument for the RDP is the fear of lock-in, the idea that
consumers will continue to use an inferior product because of high
switching costs. 86 This Part of the Essay analyzes the RDP under E.U.
competition law and U.S. antitrust law, which we refer to generally
here as “competition law.” The conclusion is striking: The RDP as
proposed is far broader than competition law would support. The
chief goal of competition law is to increase consumer welfare. 87 At
least as understood in competition law, the proposed RDP is consid-

83. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1)–(2), at 53.
84. See supra Part I.B.1.
85. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 79, at 92–94.
86. See James F. Ponsoldt & Christopher D. David, A Comparison Between U.S. and E.U.
Antitrust Treatment of Tying Claims Against Microsoft: When Should the Bundling of Computer
Software Be Permitted?, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 421, 448 (2007) (discussing lock-in and its
effects on the software industry).
87. See FATUR, supra note 20, at 137 (“[EU competition policy] acknowledges the importance of consumer welfare.”); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993) (recognizing “the antitrust laws’ traditional concern for
consumer welfare and price competition”).
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erably over-broad and appears to reduce consumer welfare. 88 Although there may be other justifications for the RDP, Article 18 as
drafted is contrary to the teachings of competition law.
In competition law, a successful case would need to establish
three elements: dominant market power, an exclusionary practice,
and no efficiencies to offset the harms of the exclusionary practice.89
Compared with these basic requirements of an antitrust claim, the
RDP is over-broad. It applies even in the absence of market power. It
does not take into consideration the substantial efficiency arguments
that apply in many settings. Additionally, under European law for exclusionary practices, it would often be quite difficult to show the main
types of exclusionary practices, such as a refusal to supply, denial of
access to an essential facility, or a tying violation. 90
Put another way, the RDP essentially creates a per se rule for the
cases covered by the RDP—for these cases, the Draft Regulation prohibits software unless it has an EIM. 91 Current E.U. and U.S. competition law, however, applies the rule of reason to exclusionary conduct
rather than a per se rule. For those not familiar with competition law,
that means that enforcement is case by case, and depends on the efficiencies of the action as well as the possible harm to competition. 92
This departure from E.U. and U.S. competition law does not in itself
mean that the RDP is flawed. It does mean, however, that lock-in effects and high switching costs do not justify the proposed RDP. When
tested against modern understandings of competition law, the RDP as
drafted goes far beyond the rules that competition law would apply to
lock-in and switching costs, in ways that reduce consumer welfare.
This Part explores the differences between the RDP and current
competition law. First, the RDP does not require a showing of market
power and applies equally to monopolies and to small and medium

88. See Commission Communication on Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in
Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings,
2009/C 45/02, ¶¶ 86–88 [hereinafter Guidance] (recognizing that consumers may be
harmed when service providers are prevented from innovating or are excluded from the
market due to price constraints).
89. Id. ¶¶ 9–31.
90. See id. ¶¶ 47–62, 75–90 (discussing various anticompetitive actions and how they
would be dealt with under the Draft Regulation).
91. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18, at 53; see also supra Part I.B.1.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 34, 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
FATUR, supra note 20, at 162.
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enterprises. 93 Second, the RDP uses a per se approach that does not
compare the precompetitive efficiencies against the harms to competition. 94 Third, failure to write EIM software does not fit under the
traditional categories of exclusionary conduct prohibited by current
competition law. 95
A. Market Power and Effects on Small and Medium Enterprises
Competition law leads to enforcement only when market power
exists: “A finding of dominance in general, and a high market share
in particular, serves as an initial screen to identify market conduct
which may potentially be harmful.” 96 Where there is no market power, consumers and the market are not harmed by the actions of one
company—the company by definition cannot exercise monopoly
power. 97 In the E.U., the Commission strongly presumes that companies with less than a forty percent market share do not dominate a
market, and so are exempted from competition enforcement. 98 The
required showing of market power, to trigger possible enforcement, is
generally even higher in the U.S. 99 In addition to high market share,
substantial barriers to entry must exist for a company to possess market power. 100
The Draft Regulation applies the RDP even in the absence of
market power. Any company that meets the other criteria of standard
format and electronic processing, for example, comes within the requirements of the RDP. 101 This simple fact is a major departure from
competition law. Applying the RDP in the absence of market power
signals that the monopoly power problems of lock-in alone do not jus-

93. See infra Part II.A.
94. See infra Part II.B.
95. See infra Part II.C.
96. FATUR, supra note 20, at 246.
97. See id. (discussing the effects-based approach).
98. Guidance, supra note 88, ¶ 14.
99. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 450-51 (4th
Cir. 2011) (“Supreme Court cases, as well as cases from this court, suggest that absent special circumstances, a defendant must have a market share of at least 50 percent before he
can be guilty of monopolization.”).
100. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
101. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18, at 53.
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tify the proposal as drafted. 102 By not requiring market power, the
RDP imposes obligations on numerous companies without a corresponding consumer benefit.
Competition law requires market power before enforcing against
even very large companies. 103 Competition agencies are even less likely to bring enforcement actions against small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”). 104 Yet the RDP as drafted applies to SMEs the
same as it does to large software companies. 105 Mandating the RDP
for SMEs, in the name of preventing lock-ins, has at least three major
disadvantages. First, SMEs rarely, if ever, have market power. Second,
the compliance burdens on SMEs are likely to be substantial relative
to the benefits. Under the RDP as drafted, a start-up in a garage
would appear to have the same responsibility to create an EIM as a
large company. 106 A large company may have enough software writers
and compliance lawyers on staff to build and test the EIM to meet the
Article 18 requirements. SMEs are far less likely to have the resources
to learn their compliance obligations and write software to meet
them. The third disadvantage follows from the first two: Innovation
by small software companies will be discouraged if they must write an
EIM from the start and comply with the RDP. 107 The concern is that
the RDP, rather than promoting consumer welfare, would deprive

102. Put another way, competition law would not find an enforceable harm in the absence of market power. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. A proponent of the
RDP as drafted would thus need to have factual views about markets that are quite different from the views of the competition enforcement agencies. Presumably, a heavy burden
should be on proponents to make the case that markets affected by the RDP are so far at
variance with the competition agencies’ understanding of markets. To date, proponents
have not made any such case.
103. The test in both the U.S. and E.U. is market share and not market size. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d at 54; E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 637 F.3d at 450-51.
104. Cf. supra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining that the E.U. will not presume market competition violations where a company has less than a forty percent market
share).
105. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, at 19.
106. See id. (applying the Draft Regulation to “micro, small and medium-sized enterprises”).
107. Cf. Guidance, supra note 88, ¶ 87 (recognizing that proposed rules and regulations may prevent companies from innovating or bringing their services to the market).
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consumers of innovative products with no corresponding benefit to
competition generally. 108
B. The RDP Fails to Weigh Pro-Competitive Efficiencies Against AntiCompetitive Harms
At a common-sense level, there are significant efficiencies to letting software writers decide what functions to include in their software. The leading decision in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 109 captured this intuition that there are
many valid reasons a programmer might include or exclude particular
features and functions, including that “integration of new functionality into platform software is a common practice,” 110 and integration “is
common among firms without market power.” 111 That a practice is
common among firms without market power is strong evidence that
the practice has efficiencies, rather than generally being an attempt to
lock-in or otherwise exercise market power. 112
The RDP, as drafted, creates a per se rule against software that
lacks an EIM. 113 The provider cannot defend itself by saying that its
practices improve competition and are more efficient than they would
be if it followed the RDP requirements. Competition law, by contrast,
uses a rule of reason rather than a per se rule, which allows deviations
where significant efficiencies exist. 114 E.U. competition law frowns on
the use of a per se rule in the area of exclusionary practices, such as

108. As with other regulatory requirements, an additional concern is that established
companies that become experts in the regulations will use them to their own competitive
advantage. For instance, the RDP might enable a major company to complain when a
smaller company is not complying with the RDP. In this way, the large player can impose
regulatory burdens on smaller competitors, and also in this case perhaps require the
smaller competitor to shift data to the large company. Such mandated shifts in data from
smaller to larger companies can actually reinforce problems of competition in the market.
109. 253 F.3d 34 (2001).
110. Id. at 95.
111. Id. at 93.
112. See id. at 86–87 (reasoning that firms without market power tend to buy “bundled”
goods and services, as opposed to buying those services separately, because it is more efficient, not because the bundled goods are the only option available).
113. See supra Part I.B.1.
114. FATUR, supra note 20, at 162.
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an alleged lock-in. 115 Additionally, as the D.C. Circuit explained in its
Microsoft decision, “[i]t is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations.” 116 Adopting a per se rule for what software is included in a
product “creates undue risks of error and of deterring welfareenhancing innovation.” 117
As discussed in this Section, a per se rule would likely create significant inefficiencies for current software providers by requiring
them to create an EIM for software covered by the RDP. Creating an
EIM could be costly for both SMEs and larger providers. Writing interoperable software is more challenging than it may seem. 118 A per se
rule would also harm dynamic efficiency—the efficiency of the market
over time. 119 The ability to attract users to a software service, and keep
them there in at least some instances, is an important incentive for
innovation and new entrants. 120 Additionally, and ironically, the RDP
as drafted may create incentives for software providers to actually reduce their use of commonly accepted standards.
1.

Static Efficiency and the Cost and Difficulty of Achieving
Interoperability

The RDP mandates that covered software include an EIM by requiring that the data subject be able to get covered data “without hindrance” from the first party. 121 As many readers have likely experienced in their own lives, it is often difficult to get two software

115. See, e.g., C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lelos Kai Sia EE v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE
Farmakeftikon Proionton, 2008 E.C.R. I-07139, ¶ 62 (“For both legal and economic reasons, Article 82 EC [the provision governing exclusionary practices] is not appropriate to
govern conduct branded as abusive per se.”).
116. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 84 (alteration in original) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)).
117. Id. at 89–90. Tying law in the E.U., similar to U.S. law, recognizes that “serious
errors can be made if such [tying] practices are condemned as anti-competitive without a
thorough analysis and balancing of legitimate production purposes and anti-competitive
effects.” FATUR, supra note 20, at 162. In fact, “the Commission explicitly confirmed its
intention to apply the rule of reason type of analysis to tying and bundling cases.” Id. at
162.
118. Shah & Kesan, supra note 31, at 143.
119. See infra Part II.B.2.
120. See infra Part II.B.2.
121. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18, at 53.
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programs to interoperate smoothly. 122 Interoperability is a problem
for even the most sophisticated of organizations. “Even the internationally respected Mayo Clinic, which treats more than a million patients a year, has serious unresolved problems after working for years
to get its three major electronic records systems to talk to one another.” 123 In assessing the efficiency of the RDP, the costs of creating the
EIM should be weighed against the benefits of the RDP.
The cost and difficulty of achieving interoperability is highlighted in a recent study by Professors Rajiv Shah and Jay Kesan that assessed the effects of open standard document formats on interoperaThe authors examined interoperability for the
bility. 124
OpenDocument Format (“ODF”) and other alternatives to Microsoft’s
proprietary DOC format. 125 Their study showed “very significant issues with interoperability” between existing document formats. 126
More specifically, “[t]he best implementations may result in formatting problems, while the worst implementations actually lose information contained in pictures, footnotes, comments, tracking changes,
and tables.” 127
This finding of the difficulty of interoperability suggests important lessons for interoperability and the RDP. First, the study considered an internationally recognized and widely supported open
standard, ODF. 128 This sort of open standard for word processing
would presumably meet Article 18’s definition of an “electronic and
structured format which is commonly used.” 129 Thus, Shah and

122. See PALFREY & GASSER, INTEROP, supra note 61, at 21-22 (discussing a common interoperability problem between a Mac and a projector).
123. Milt Freudenheim, The Ups and Downs of Electronic Medical Records, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2012, at D4.
124. See Shah & Kesan, supra note 31, at 121 (discussing how OpenDocument Format
and OpenOffice.org combine to create a program that is not limited to one software vendor).
125. Id. at 119.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See OPENDOCUMENT FORMAT, http://opendocumentformat.org/ (last visited Nov.
12, 2012) (“OpenDocument Format (or ODF for short) is the worlds [sic] leading document standard as maintained by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS), and was first adopted as an international standard in
2005.”).
129. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53.
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Kesan’s experience with ODF is relevant to the likely experience with
other open standards going forward. Second, the study applied to
major software products with large numbers of users. 130 Google Docs,
for instance, had around four million users at the time of the study, 131
but the study found significant interoperability lapses by Google
Docs. 132 Third, the study applied to software producers that had
strong commercial incentives to achieve interoperability. Google
Docs, for example, is a major strategic investment by a leading company trying to gain market share in the large market for word processing software. 133
This study, in short, supports the idea that interoperability may
well be costly and difficult to achieve. 134 The requirement of interoperability could impose high costs on small companies relative to the
size of their market. Even for major software programs, supported by
large companies with strong commercial incentives, the study found
significant issues of interoperability. 135 Especially if the first party has
a responsibility to make sure that interoperability works with a range
of second parties, then there may be serious feasibility concerns about
the extent to which the RDP can be achieved in practice. This sort of
mandate goes well beyond what is required by competition law. 136 At a
minimum, regulators should not assume that interoperability is easy
and inexpensive to achieve.

130. Shah & Kesan, supra note 31, at 119 (explaining that their study of ODF interoperability included popular software programs such as Microsoft Office, Wordperfect, and
Google Docs).
131. Catone, supra note 70.
132. Shah & Kesan, supra note 31, at 133–34 (finding that Google Docs had “significant
problems correctly reading the test documents” in the interoperability study).
133. See Catone, supra note 70 (noting that Google Docs is trying to compete with Microsoft Word for customers).
134. See Shah & Kesan, supra note 31, at 136, 143 (failing to find 100 percent interoperability between the commonly used document formats and noting that achieving interoperability might involve costly updates and testing).
135. Id. at 136.
136. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertically Integrated Monopolist, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 709, 735 (2010) (“If the firm lacks the technical
ability to supply an entrant, then the refusal to supply clearly would be permitted.”).
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2. Dynamic Efficiency and a Reduced Incentive to Use Standards and
to Innovate
Along with current costs of creating an EIM, the RDP can have
significant effects on dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare over
time. First, the RDP creates one especially perverse incentive. The
Paragraph 1 requirements about providing a copy of personal data
apply only to companies that process data “in an electronic and structured format which is commonly used.” 137 Based on the language of
the Draft Regulation, companies can avoid the need to write an EIM if
they decide not to use electronic and structured formats. Ironically,
this measure designed to increase interoperability thus could lead
companies to reduce their use of the standard formats that foster interoperability. 138 With an increase in the use of non-structured formats, the RDP may exacerbate current data lock-in problems—
precisely the opposite of the intended effect.
Second, and more broadly, a major consideration in achieving
consumer welfare is how to create incentives for innovation. 139 Consumers flock to new services, such as social networks, and new devices,
such as smartphones. A principal task of antitrust law for the information and communications technology (“ICT”) sector is how to foster continued innovation. 140
Proponents of the RDP and of interoperability generally make
the case that greater interoperability will lead to more innovation. 141
The idea is that there will be less lock-in, and the second players will
be able to offer new products and services once portability increases
and switching costs are reduced: “One of the reasons why we tend to
like interoperability is that we believe it leads to innovation, as well as
other positive things like consumer choice, ease of use, and competition.” 142
This sort of increased innovation by second players can certainly
occur. Mandated interoperability, however, can also reduce innova-

137. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53.
138. Thanks to Howard Beales for suggesting this point.
139. See FATUR, supra note 20, at 178 (“[T]he core issue with regard to imposing a duty
to deal is balancing short-run gains in efficiency with long-run incentives to invest and
compete dynamically, which should be done on a case-by-case basis.”).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., PALFREY & GASSER, INTEROP, supra note 61, at 11–12.
142. Gasser & Palfrey, Breaking Down, supra note 61, at ii.
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tion. 143 In addition to the cost of writing an EIM, there will be lower
expected returns to a new entrant whose business plan is based at
least in part on not fully sharing the data provided by the consumer.144
This sort of potential first player will have lower expected profits if
there is lower consumer stickiness to their platform.
Resolving this tradeoff between innovation by first players and
second players is a complex task. 145 Our main point here is that this
complexity supports a rule of reason approach, based on the characteristics of a particular market, rather than the per se approach of the
RDP. Although market structures vary considerably, important aspects of ICT industries suggest that a rule that mandates interoperability will often reduce innovation. 146 In general, a major theme of innovation theory is the Schumpeterian idea of creative destruction.147
Dynamic competition in the technology space has resulted in “successive waves of creative destruction.” 148 For example, MySpace replaced
Friendster as the dominant social network, only for Facebook to later
usurp MySpace’s position as the market leader. 149

143. See FATUR, supra note 20, at 81 (“The right to exclude ensures that successful innovators can recover their sunk costs and receive a return that compensates them for the
risk.”).
144. Id.
145. The debate about interoperability is structurally similar to longstanding debates in
the intellectual property area. Owners of patents and copyrights argue that they need
strong intellectual property rights in order to create incentives for the first players, who
are the owners of such rights. Yochai Benkler, Brett Frischmann, and other scholars emphasize the importance of the second players, who make fair use of copyrights or otherwise innovate based on narrower property rights.

See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE

WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL
VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012). We do not take sides in this general debate about
the scope of intellectual property rights; instead, the point here is that there are complex,
situation-dependent considerations about what is likely to create optimal overall innovation, considering effects on both first players and second players. Copyright and other intellectual property law is very complex—we should not expect a simple rule of mandated
interoperability to best cover the full range of market structures.
146. FATUR, supra note 20, at 81.
147. Id. at 72; see also Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1771, 1800 (2012) (explaining that Schumpeterian competition consists of “one dominant firm being replaced by another, and then yet another dominant firm”).
148. Waller, supra note 147, at 1801.
149. Id.
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Many technology markets have the basic feature that one player
gets a lead and then becomes a market leader, often with a large market share. 150 Economists have at least three related names for this
phenomenon: first-mover advantage (an early entrant can gain significant market share), 151 network effects (where the usefulness of a
product to one user increases as the number of other users increases), 152 and tipping effect (where one seller gets enough of a lead on
competitors that the market tips to a very large market share). 153 Paul
Geroski has described the phenomenon of competition for the market, rather than the traditional competition in a market. 154 He writes:
“[I]nnovative entry involves producing new products or services, and,
for this reason it usually also involves a different business design.” 155
Such entry is costly and risky. 156 If there is a rule, such as the RDP,
that reduces the profitability of such entry, then we can expect a lower
amount of innovation in those new business designs.
Competition law encourages technical innovation that creates
dynamic efficiency. 157 As Judge Learned Hand explained, “[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be
turned upon when he wins.” 158 As discussed in more detail below,
competition law compensates successful innovators for the development risk by generally giving them the right to exclude competitors
from their assets. 159 A per se mandate of the RDP cuts against this
basic principle of competition law, and will tend to reduce innovation
where there is competition for the market.
Depending on the breadth of the RDP, Article 18 can specifically
reduce investment by first parties in innovative data products. One
example of an innovative first party is Angie’s List, which since 1996
has compiled reliable reviews about service providers ranging from

150. FATUR, supra note 20, at 85–86.
151. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 479, 495 (1998).
152. Id. at 483.
153. Id. at 505.
154. P.A. Geroski, Competition in Markets and Competition for Markets, 3 J. INDUS.,
COMPETITION, & TRADE 151, 162 (2003).
155. Id. at 163.
156. Id.
157. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
158. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
159. See FATUR, supra note 20, at 81.
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plumbers to doctors. 160 Angie’s List, unlike its competitors, ensures
trusted reviews by not accepting anonymous reviews and only counting reviews from active members. 161 If a second player can force companies such as Angie’s List to transfer valuable customer data “without
hindrance,” then there is a reduced incentive to innovate and compile unique data. Under the RDP as currently drafted, future companies like Angie’s List that benefit millions of consumers may never get
started.
There are thus plausible precompetitive justifications, including
incentives for innovations, for services that do not provide an EIM.
The D.C. Circuit feared that “per se rules might stunt valuable innovation” by “not giv[ing] newly integrated products a fair shake.” 162 Under the rule of reason approach, companies can prove that efficiency
justifications outweigh competitive harm caused by restricting data
transfers. 163 Under the per se approach of RDP, companies may decide not to engage in risky investments in innovation because of lower
expected returns.
C. Failure to Write an EIM Is Generally Not Exclusionary Conduct
Under Competition Law
In the discussion of competition law thus far, we have started
with points that we thought would be intuitive to readers whose main
field is not antitrust—market power is needed before competition law
intervenes, and there are likely important static and dynamic efficiencies to allowing software companies to decide what functions to include in their products and services. We now turn to the somewhat
more technical discussion of when competition law will find exclusionary conduct—the sort of action to exclude a competitor, such as a
second party seeking to use data, that will trigger scrutiny under competition law.
The alleged exclusionary act at issue is lack of interoperability, or
failure to write an EIM. Competition law could characterize, or describe, the decision of a software company not to write an EIM in at
least three related ways. First, and most appropriately, the decision
not to write an EIM might be described as what E.U. law calls “refusal

160. ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/ (last accessed Oct. 4, 2012). One author, Lagos, has worked for Angie’s List.
161. Id.
162. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
163. Id. at 92.
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to supply” and U.S. antitrust law usually calls “refusal to deal.” 164 Second, the decision of the first party might violate the essential facilities
doctrine, which is a type of refusal to supply. 165 Third, the decision of
the first party might be considered an anticompetitive tying arrangement, on the theory that the software service is foreclosing competition by tying its offering with a non-interoperable software module. 166
Our view is that failure to supply an EIM would typically comply
with competition law under any of these theories. Competition law
starts with a presumption that companies have freedom to decide with
whom they will deal. 167 In a 2004 case, Verizon Communications Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 168 the Supreme Court of the United
States discussed “the few existing exceptions from the proposition
that there is no duty to aid competitors.” 169 E.U. courts similarly require a showing of exceptional circumstances when examining a refusal to supply. In addition to holding a dominant position in the
primary market, the European Commission has announced three enforcement priorities for a refusal to supply claim: “the refusal relates
to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively on a downstream market, the refusal is likely to lead to
the elimination of effective competition on the downstream market,
and the refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm.” 170 In its 2007 decision, Microsoft v. Commission, 171 the E.U. Court of First Instance stated
that three conditions are needed to meet the “exceptional” requirements for proving a refusal to supply:
[I]n the first place, the refusal relates to a product or service
indispensable to the exercise of a particular activity on a

164. See Guidance, supra note 88, ¶ 75–90, at 18; Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices
of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408–09 (2004).
165. Trinko, 540 U.S at 410.
166. See Guidance, supra note 88, ¶¶ 47–62, at 15–16.
167. In U.S. antitrust law, this presumption derives from the oft-cited Supreme Court
statement in United States v. Colgate & Co., where the Court stated: “In the absence of any
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long
recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely
to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.” 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919).
168. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
169. Id. at 411.
170. Guidance, supra note 88, ¶ 81, at 18–19.
171. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3619.
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neighbouring market; in the second place, the refusal is of
such a kind as to exclude any effective competition on that
neighbouring market; in the third place, the refusal prevents
the appearance of a new product for which there is potential
consumer demand. 172
The threshold for showing a refusal to supply is thus clearly
much higher than for finding a violation under Article 18. For instance, refusal to supply applies only to something “indispensable” to
a neighboring market, and the refusal must “exclude any effective
competition” for that other market. 173 The Commission also expects
to enforce the Regulation only where the refusal leads to consumer
harm, and the analysis here has shown multiple respects where the
RDP is instead likely to create consumer harm as understood in competition law. 174
The concept of essential facilities is closely related to the idea of
refusal to supply. 175 This idea of essential facilities might seem like a
good fit with the RDP: The data subject and the second party might
need access to the data held by the first party to bring competition to
markets that rely on that data. The essential facilities doctrine, however, has experienced serious criticism from scholars and the United
States Supreme Court. 176 Even advocates for the essential facilities
doctrine, moreover, would apply it in far more restrictive circumstances than contemplated by the RDP. For instance, former FTC
Chairman Robert Pitofsky has written in support of the doctrine, in
connection with a 2002 E.U. competition case. 177 He writes:
[T]o establish antitrust liability under the essential facilities
doctrine, a party must prove four factors: (1) control of the
essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability

172. Id. ¶ 332, at 3726.
173. Id.
174. See supra Part II.A–B.
175. Mats A. Bergman, The Role of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 46 ANTITRUST BULL.
403, 413 (2001).
176. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust
Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 443-47 (2002) (describing the controversies related to right of
access to an essential facility controlled by a monopolist and referencing Supreme Court
decisions applying the essential facilities doctrine).
177. Robert Pitofsky, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law (submitted
to the European Commission), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intel
propertycomments/pitofskyrobert.pdf (last modified June 20, 2007).
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practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility;
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and
(4) the feasibility of providing the facility to competitors. 178
These factors are much stricter than Article 18. The factors require a finding of monopoly, and there must be a “denial of the use
of the facility,” which is a greater degree of exclusionary conduct than
simply a failure to write an EIM. 179 Furthermore, the owner of the facility has the opportunity to dispute whether the access is feasible,180
the sort of efficiencies argument that is applied under a rule of reason. Similarly, scholars such as Brett Frischmann and Spencer Waller,
who write in favor of open access principles and the essential facilities
doctrine, would require a high threshold before applying the doctrine. 181
Along with refusal to supply or essential facilities, one might
characterize the RDP as preventing a tying arrangement. One might
believe that the first party is tying its product, such as a social network,
to a tied product, the software that governs export of data. The analogy is not precise—generally there is no separate product for an EIM.
The idea of a tie, however, may be useful in suggesting that there
could be an obligation of the first party to tie its product to an EIM
that provides portability rather than to an EIM that lacks portability.
As with the other alleged exclusionary conduct, however, Article
18 is much stricter than the conclusions about tying that competition
law has arrived at after years of analysis and case law. In finding that
Microsoft had in fact illegally tied Windows Media Player with the
Windows operating system, the E.U. Court of First Instance set forth
the factors needed to prove a tying violation. 182 The court first required that the tying and tied products be two separate products, 183
which is not the case with a software service and its EIM. Second, the

178. Id. at 5-6; see also MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1082,
1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983) (listing the same four factors).
179. MCI Commc’ns, 708 F.2d at 1132–33.
180. Pitofsky, supra note 177, at 6–8.
181. Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 19 (2008) (“We see an important but limited role for the essential facilities doctrine in antitrust law with respect to infrastructure.”).
182. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3619, ¶ 842, at 3876; see also
Ponsoldt & David, supra note 86, at 443, 446 (reiterating the four factors and the holding
in the case).
183. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3619, ¶ 842, at 3876.

364

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:335

court analyzed whether “the undertaking concerned is dominant in
the market for the tying product.” 184 Once again, competition law only steps in to protect consumer welfare where there is dominant market power, in contrast to Article 18. Third, the court analyzed whether “the undertaking concerned does not give customers a choice to
obtain the tying product without the tied product.” 185 Although a first
party may not create an EIM that operates “without hindrance,” customers retain the legal and often practical ability to export their data
to a different online service. Fourth, the court analyzed whether “the
practice in question forecloses competition.” 186 This factor allows a
court to consider the dynamic effects on the market; as discussed in
Part II.B.2, these dynamic factors may well favor less of an RDP than
Article 18 provides. In addition, the court analyzed Microsoft’s proposed objective justification for its product decision: the possibility
that its conduct had efficiencies or was justified by reasons other than
an intent to dominate the market. 187 The Court did not find such an
objective justification in the facts of that case. 188 Under the different
facts of the leading Microsoft decision in the United States, the D.C.
Circuit eloquently discussed the reasons to give software providers
flexibility in deciding what features and functions to include in a
product: “[I]ntegration of new functionality into platform software is
a common practice,” and integration “is common among firms without market power.” 189
In conclusion on competition law, exclusionary practices trigger
enforcement only where there is a particularized showing in a specific
market of harm to consumers. 190 Competition law acts only where
there is strong market power, and efficiencies and other justifications
can be given to justify behavior that otherwise may appear exclusionary. 191 This accumulated wisdom and experience in competition law,

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II–3619, ¶¶ 1144–47, at 3963–
64.
188. Id. ¶¶ 1155–58, at 3966–67.
189. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 93, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
190. See Guidance, supra note 88, ¶ 19, at 9 (listing “[f]oreclosure leading to consumer
harm” as one of the general elements of a violation of Article 82, which prohibits abuses of
a dominant market position).
191. Id. ¶¶ 9–18, 28–31, at 8–12.
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designed to address lock-in effects and high switching costs, is different in numerous respects from the Draft Regulation’s text for Article
18. It thus appears difficult to justify the current text on the basis of
lock-in or other competition law concerns.
III. THE RDP AND PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL PRIVACY RIGHTS
The previous Part concluded that the proposed RDP is not a
good fit with E.U. and U.S. competition law. Another major rationale
for the RDP is that it protects individual rights in data protection.
Among the brief mentions of the RDP in the Draft Regulation, the
following is most on point: “As a precondition and in order to further
improve access of individuals to their personal data, [the RDP] provides the right to obtain from the controller those data in a structured
and commonly used electronic format.” 192
This part of the Essay critically evaluates the proposal to recognize a new right to obtain personal data in a structured and commonly used electronic format. In considering the claimed individual
right, we repeat our statement from the Introduction that the idea of
data portability is appealing. 193 We hope that it will be implemented
as good practice in a range of settings, and we note that major online
services have improved data portability over time. 194 The discussion
here, however, is how to assess a claimed right of data portability, as
implemented in laws such as the proposed Article 18.
In assessing this claim, we briefly examine the extent to which
the RDP should qualify as a “human right” or “fundamental right” in
the context of global human rights jurisprudence generally and E.U.
law more specifically. 195 Whatever sort of right may be implicated, the
process for defining the RDP appears to essentially be normal legislation and regulation rather than constitutional deliberation. 196 The
definition of the RDP should be based on democratic policy-making
rather than rights jurisprudence. Next, the discussion shows how the
RDP differs substantially from the pre-existing E.U. right of access, in
ways that make the former more than a routine variation on the lat-

192. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, at 9; see also Zanfir, supra note 13, at 151 (stating
that restricting data flow is a violation of human rights).
193. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 5.
195. See infra Part III.A.
196. See infra Part III.A.
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ter. 197 Finally, the proposed right raises serious risks for another principle of data protection law: protecting the security of an individual’s
personal data. In our world of weak authentication and rampant identity theft, moving all of a person’s data to another system “without
hindrance” creates security risks that can outweigh the portability
benefits. 198
A. The RDP’s Uncertain Status Under Human Rights and Fundamental
Rights Jurisprudence
To determine whether the RDP is justified on the basis of individual rights, it is helpful to clarify the meaning of “fundamental
rights” within E.U. law, as contrasted with human rights jurisprudence
more generally, or constitutional rights as understood in the United
States. At least for U.S.-trained lawyers, such as the authors, the process for defining a new “fundamental” right in the E.U. appears much
closer to standard legislation and regulation than it is to a new constitutional provision.
It is well beyond the scope of this Essay to provide a full discussion of how to identify a new human right. Drawing on the work of
noted moral philosopher Joseph Raz, however, there are reasons to
be cautious in concluding that the RDP should qualify. In two recent
articles, Raz critiques the practice of multiplying the number of human rights. 199 He states: “An ever growing number of rights are
claimed to be human rights” and lists numerous examples, such as a
right to globalization, the right to comprehensive sexual education,
and a right to a secure, healthy, and ecologically sound environment. 200 The range of the newly claimed rights should encourage
caution before accepting each newly asserted right. Raz notes that
“philosophers tend to take it for granted that human rights are important rights.” 201 He also emphasizes that a key function of human

197. See infra Part III.B.
198. See infra Part III.C.
199. Joseph Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations (Univ. of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14/2007) [hereinafter Raz, Without
Foundations], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999874; Joseph Raz, Human Rights in
the Emerging World Order, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 31 (2010) [hereinafter Raz, Emerging World Order].
200. Joseph Raz, Without Foundations, supra note 199, at 2; see also Joseph Raz, Emerging
World Order, supra note 200.
201. Id. at 3.
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rights is to define conditions that are so serious that violations justify
international intervention. 202 Compared to protection against genocide or other rights that justify international intervention, a right to
portability in data does not seem to be at the same level of importance.
Instead of this sort of human right, however, the Draft Regulation contemplates that the RDP would be a “fundamental” right, as
part of the well-developed jurisprudence in the E.U. about fundamental rights in the area of data protection. 203 In the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), issued in 1950, Article 8 established
the right for respect of “private and family life.” 204 Courts have understood Article 8 to include the protection of personal data. 205 The
Treaty of the European Union (“TEU”), which became effective in
1993, states: “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] and
as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.”206
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”),
which supplements the TEU, provides: “Everyone has the right to the

202. Id. at 9–10.
203. See, e.g., Draft Regulation, supra note 1, at 1, (discussing the E.U.’s dual goals of
protecting the fundamental right to data protection and guaranteeing the free flow of personal data between Member States); see also Commission Staff Working Paper for Impact Assessment, at 29 SEC (2012) 72 final (Jan. 25, 2012). The paper states:
In today’s digitised society, communication and interaction rely on digital media
and communications channels. Web 2.0 tools, including social media, play an
increasingly important role for social interaction and exchange. Not being able
to use these media effectively restricts the exercise of fundamental rights in the
social reality.”
Id.
204. European Convention on Human Rights as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14,
5 C.E.T.S. 1, 10–11 (2002), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/
D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/CONVENTION_ENG_WEB.pdf.

Specifi-

cally, the ECHR states that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.” Id.
205. See, e.g., S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 29 (“The protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her
right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.”).
206. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 6, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 19 [hereinafter TFEU].
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protection of personal data concerning them.” 207 These provided the
basis for the Data Protection Directive of 1995, 208 and for the Draft
Regulation proposed in 2012. 209
Compared with the U.S. procedures for creating a new constitutional right, which requires amending the Constitution, the E.U. procedures for defining data protection rights are substantially closer to
ordinary legislation and regulation. Under U.S. law, an amendment
to the Constitution requires a strict super-majority process, typically
with two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives and then
ratification by three-quarters of the states. 210 By contrast, the right to
protection of personal data under Article 16 of the TFEU is defined
and subject to modification by the “European Parliament and the
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure”
of the E.U. 211 The Draft Regulation states that it is based on Article 16
of the TFEU, 212 and thus proceeds under ordinary legislative procedure. In addition, Paragraph 3 of Article 18 of the Draft Regulation
delegates a large portion of the details of defining the RDP to the
Commission. 213
The discussion here shows that the procedure for defining a new
“fundamental” right within the E.U. is different from defining a new
human right that justifies international intervention, or a new constitutional right in the U.S., which requires a difficult-to-enact supermajority vote. 214 The existence and scope of the RDP is defined by

207. TFEU, supra note 206, art. 16, at 55. In addition, the E.U. ratified the Treaty of
Lisbon in 2009; with that ratification, the E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000
shifted from having persuasive authority to having binding authority on the Member
States. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Declarations Concerning Provisions of the Treaties, Dec. 13,
2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 249.
208. See supra note 17.
209. See supra note 1.
210. U.S. CONST. art. V, § 5.
211. TFEU, supra note 206, art. 16, at 55.
212. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, Explanatory Memorandum § 3.1, at 5.
213. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(3), at 53. For U.S. trained lawyers, this delegation to the Commission may appear to resemble regulation, covered by the Administrative Procedure Act, rather than to legislation requiring concurrence of the legislature and
the executive.
214. See supra notes 202 and 210 and accompanying text.
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“the ordinary legislative procedure.” 215 There are vital issues of human dignity and freedom involved in defining fundamental rights,
but there is no pre-existing constitution or other text that inevitably
dictates how fundamental rights will be shaped in the regulatory process. 216 The definition of a new right in the area of data portability is
legitimately open to factual and policy debates that inform “the ordinary legislative procedure.” 217 Efforts to understand the new proposed RDP, and critique it where necessary, should be addressed on
the merits, and not by a simple assertion that fundamental rights are
involved and so discussion is at an end.
B. The RDP Goes Well Beyond the Existing E.U. Right of Access
European legal instruments such as the Data Protection Directive
issued in 1995 provide individuals a right to access their personal data. 218 The access right in that directive included “communication to
[the individual] in an intelligible form of the data undergoing processing.” 219 The Draft Regulation says that the RDP is included “[a]s a
precondition and in order to further improve access of individuals to
their personal data.” 220 Our view, however, is that the new requirements in Article 18 are not a precondition for the access right and in
fact go quite far beyond existing access requirements.

215. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, at 17.
216. The “how” behind protecting fundamental rights is an open question, as the
ECHR has grappled with shaping these rights through judicial means. See, e.g., Copland v.
United Kingdom, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 9 (finding that the fundamental right of privacy
extends to data collection in the workplace (for example, an employee’s Internet usage));
K.U. v. Finland, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 10-11 (attempting to balance the fundamental right
to privacy of one data subject (an anonymous person posting an advertisement online)
against the same right of another data subject (the person whose privacy was violated by
the anonymous poster)); see also Research Div. of the Eur. Court of Human Rights Report on Internet: Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, at 5–10, (2011), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/E3B11782-7E42-418B-AC04A29BEDC0400F/0/RAPPORT_RECHERCHE_Internet_Freedom_Expression_EN.pdf
(discussing case-law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding different dataprotection and retention issues relevant for the Internet).
217. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, at 17.
218. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 17, art. 12, at 42.
219. Id.
220. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, § 3.4.3.3, at 9.
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As discussed above, Paragraph 1 of Article 18 in many cases provides the right to obtain data “in an electronic and structured format
which is commonly used and allows for further use by the data subject.” 221 Note that the old access requirement of communication “in
an intelligible form” 222 expands to a requirement under the RDP that
the format be electronic and structured, and allow for further use by
the data subject. 223 Paragraph 2 further requires information in an
automated processing system to be provided “in an electronic format
which is commonly used, without hindrance” from the entity operating the system. 224
The RDP differs in at least two important ways from the previous
right of access. First, data protection regulators have previously stated
that controllers could work with the data subject to narrow an access
request. 225 For instance, in response to a request that an individual
get all data about herself, the controller could speak with the individual to determine what specific information the individual was seeking. 226 This ability to define the scope of a request is considerably less
burdensome on the controller than the requirement to provide all of
an individual’s personal data through an automated process, and to
do so “without hindrance.” 227 Second, data protection regulators have
previously made clear that the right of access did not require the controller to create a computer system in advance to give automatic responses to access requests. 228 By contrast, the RDP appears to require

221. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53.
222. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 17, art. 12, at 42.
223. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53.
224. Id. art. 18(2), at 53.
225. Data Protection Good Practice Note: Checklist for Handling Requests for Personal Information (Subject Access Requests), INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE (2007), http://www.ico.gov.uk/
for_organisations/data_protection/subject_access_requests.aspx.
226. Cf. id. (explaining that organizations can and should provide all information requested that they hold under the ordinary course of business, but that they can also speak
to the requester to clarify her request).
227. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53.
228. See Subject Access Requests: How Do I Respond?, INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE,
http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/subject_access_requests.aspx
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (explaining that data controllers have up to forty days to respond to a request). Data Protection Act, ch. 29, pt. II, §§ 7(8), 7(10) (1998) (stating that
“a data controller shall comply with a request under this section promptly and in any event
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creation of the EIM in advance, so that data can automatically be exported from a system the controller must build for that purpose. 229
Not only are the requirements of the RDP different from those
for the right of access, but the Draft Regulation itself provides support
for the idea that the RDP is a new right that is distinct from, and goes
beyond, the right of access. At a formal level, Section 2 of the Draft
Regulation is entitled “Information and Access to Data,” 230 and contains Article 15, entitled “Right of access for the data subject.” 231 Separately, Section 3 is entitled “Rectification and Erasure,” 232 and Article
18 the “Right to data portability.” 233 The fact that the RDP is in a different section of the Draft Regulation and has a different name is evidence that the RDP is not merely a small modification to the existing
right to access. 234
The way the term “data portability” is used in other contexts further shows the gap between data portability and the E.U. definition of
the right of access. Notably, the Data Portability Project was created

before the end of the prescribed period beginning with the relevant day” and “the prescribed period” means forty days or such other period as may be prescribed”).
229. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
230. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2, at 48.
231. Id. art. 15, at 50–51.
232. Id. § 3, at 51.
233. Id. art. 18, at 53.
234. Moreover, publicity materials produced by the E.U. delineate between mere access
and data portability. See Fact Sheet: Why Do We Need an EU Data Protection Reform?, EUROPEAN
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/factsheets
/1_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (explaining that the proposed regulation will provide “[e]asier access to one’s own data and the right of data portability, that is, easier transfer of personal data from one service provider to another”). The European Commission
also released a fact sheet on how data protection reform strengthens citizens’ rights. Fact
Sheet: How Does the Data Protection Reform Strengthen Citizens’ Rights?, EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/factsheets/2_en.pdf
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012). According to the fact sheet:
The Commission also wants to guarantee free and easy access to your personal
data, making it easier for you to see what personal information is held about you
by companies and public authorities, and make it easier for you to transfer your
personal data between service providers—the so-called principle of “data portability.”
Id.
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in 2007, 235 and incorporated in the U.S. as a non-profit in 2009. 236 A
major effort of the project has been a series of ten model questions
issued in 2010 “that sites can answer to explain how people can bring
data in and take it out.” 237 The questions promote transparency, so
that an organization can clearly communicate its policies and practices to the public. 238 The ten questions cover a diverse set of issues, including the creation of a new identity on the site, the ability to import
data to the site, and whether there is automatic updating for actions
taken on other sites. 239
Two aspects of the project’s model questions are relevant to our
comparison of the right of access and the meaning of data portability.
First, the project clearly states that it does not believe there are correct answers to the questions, and that the model questions promote
transparency rather than dictate practices. 240 Second, quite a few of
the questions, such as the identity and updating questions just noted,
address issues other than those covered by the longstanding E.U. definition of the right of access. 241
The meaning of any right to data portability is still in the early
stages of development, and the ten questions asked by the Data Portability Project differ substantially from the E.U. right of access. In
short, the RDP is substantially different from the pre-existing right of
access in E.U. law. If the RDP is included within E.U. law as a fundamental right, it should be recognized as a distinct and new right. 242

235. Elias Bizannes, History of the Project, DATAPORTABILITY PROJECT (Mar. 21, 2009),
http://wiki.dataportability.org/display/dpmain/History+of+the+Project;jsessionid=6FCCA
7230CE8C7011A88D7824DCC3B8E.
236. Elias Bizannes, So What Has the DataPortability Project Been Doing?, DATAPORTABILITY
PROJECT (Mar. 30, 2009), http://blog.dataportability.org/2009/03/30/so-what-has-thedataportability-project-been-doing/.
237. Elias Bizannes, Why Every Site Should Have a Data Portability Policy, TECHCRUNCH
(June 23, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/06/23/data-portability-policy/.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.; see also supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text; Data Protection Act, ch.
29, pt. II, § 7 (1998) (defining the “Right of access to Personal Data”).
242. One additional issue in defining the RDP is how to address the substantial number
of exceptions under E.U. law to the right of access. See, e.g., Helping U.S. Companies Export,
INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018380.asp (last visited
Nov. 14, 2012) (outlining the various exceptions for right to access). Where access re-
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The new right to data portability appears more closely akin to the
personal data ownership theory—“attaching property rights to personal information.” 243 The ability to transfer information “without
hindrance” gives users ownership over their information. The idea
that personal information is property has been widely debated, 244 with
some questioning whether personal data ownership has “compatibility
with the European Legal System.” 245 “So far, personal information has
not been deemed ‘property’ . . . in the EU.” 246
We do not take a position for or against the personal data ownership theory or the right to data portability as a fundamental right. Instead, we simply point out that the lack of consensus suggests that the
norms for data portability have not been established. 247 It is risky to
create a new fundamental right before there is general agreement of
the norms defining that right.
C. The RDP Is in Tension with an Individual’s Right of Data Security
Within the framework of the E.U.’s existing fundamental right to
data protection, a new right to data portability is in significant tension
with the individual’s existing right to data security. 248 With the RDP,
one-time access to a site, such as by a hacker, can turn into a lifetime’s
download of data from that site. Defining the RDP, therefore, should
be done with full awareness of risks to the right to data security. Un-

quests are made one at a time, and the controller can speak with the data subject to define
the request, then the controller can apply the exceptions where appropriate. Cf. supra
notes 225–226 and accompanying text (explaining how a request for information could be
narrowed). By contrast, it may take a considerable amount of regulatory definition and
software effort to build each access exception into a new RDP, so that a person’s records
are exported “without hindrance.” Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53.
243. David Krebs, Regulating the Cloud: A Comparative Analysis of the Current and Proposed
Privacy Frameworks in Canada and the European Union, 10 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 29, 38. Thanks
to Bartosz Marcinkowski for suggesting this similarity to the authors.
244. Id.
245. Nadezda Purtova, Property in Personal Data: A European Perspective on the Instrumentalist Theory of Propertisation, 2 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 3, *3 (2010), available at http://www.ejls.eu
/6/84UK.pdf.
246. Krebs, supra note 243, at 38.
247. Id.
248. Security of processing data is guaranteed by Article 17 of the 1995 Data Protection
Directive, and Article 30 of the 2012 Draft Regulation. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra
note 17, art. 17, at 43; Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 30, at 60.
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fortunately, Article 18 as drafted makes no mention of the right to data security.
Security has long been recognized as an important issue when
defining the ability of an individual to access data. 249 The Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) in 1999 formed an advisory committee on
Access and Security. 250 The committee report recognized that “there
is a very real tension between access and security.” 251 Notably, “privacy
is lost if a security failure results in access being granted to the wrong
person—an investigator making a pretext call, a con man engaged in
identity theft, or, in some instances, one family member in conflict
with another.” 252
Security is a materially bigger risk with the RDP. Before, access
was often one-off, with the individual asking for particular information and receiving a limited amount of data. 253 With the RDP, an
individual’s lifetime of data with a service can be downloaded all at
once. 254 The quantity of personal data at risk is therefore far greater.
The affirmative requirement to create an EIM also means that the
downloading is automated rather than the one-at-a-time responses to
access requests that have been the norm to date. 255 The Article 18 requirement of downloading data “without hindrance” adds an additional layer of risk. 256 This language could be interpreted to prohibit
a site from double-checking a user’s identity if the request comes
from a new IP address or otherwise appears to present a higher risk of
identity fraud. 257

249. See FINAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
ONLINE ACCESS AND SECURITY 19–25 (May 15, 2000) [hereinafter FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/acoas/papers/finalreport.htm (discussing security of personal data held by web pages).
250. Id. at 3.
251. Id. at 14.
252. Id.
253. See Data Protection Good Practice Note, supra note 225 (providing examples of onetime data requests, such as requests for a product serial number).
254. See Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53 (granting the user the right to a
copy of all the data held by a controller).
255. See supra notes 121 and 228 and accompanying text.
256. Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53.
257. Cf. Data Protection Good Practice Note, supra note 225 (noting that an organization
can provide the information requested when it is sure of the requester’s identity).
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Double-checking a user’s identity, however, is often appropriate
before releasing large amounts of what may be sensitive data. For
online banking transactions, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council has emphasized the importance of a layered security
system. 258 Notably, banks often set a daily limit on online consumer
transactions, such as $1000. That practice suggests the wisdom of considering something more cautious, at least for sensitive information,
than an immediate transfer of all information without hindrance.
Layered security in the banking industry includes other practices such
as: out-of-band authentication before completing internet transactions, sophisticated challenge questions, and suspicious activity detection. 259 Similar techniques could prove instrumental in protecting
consumer privacy in a world with the RDP.
The 2000 FTC report stressed a key risk with online access: the
lack of effective authentication on the Internet. 260 This lack of good
authentication continues today, precisely for the online services that
are the main subject of the RDP. A recent prominent example was
when Wired reporter Mat Honen had much of his lifetime archive of
files remotely wiped by a hacker. 261 In that instance, the hacker appeared to use “social engineering” to get into Honen’s account—the
hacker persuaded the customer service representative to reset passwords and thereby give the hacker full access to Honen’s files. 262
Any individual right in the area of data portability should thus be
considered together with the individual’s right for the data to be protected securely. Fundamental rights to flow data more quickly should
be considered together with fundamental rights to block access to
those who are not entitled to get it. 263

258. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL SUPPLEMENT TO
AUTHENTICATION IN AN INTERNET BANKING ENVIRONMENT 2 (2012), available at
http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/153051/04-27-12_fdic_combined_fil-6-28-11-auth.pdf.
259. Id. at 4.
260. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 249, at 4, 14–18.
261. Mat Honen, How Apple and Amazon Security Flaws Led to My Epic Hacking, WIRED
(Aug. 6, 2012, 08:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/08/apple-amazon-mathonan-hacking/all/.
262. Id.
263. For discussion of how there can be conflicting rights of an individual in the area of
data flows, see Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protection
vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1402–14 (2012).
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IV. INTEROPERABILITY ITSELF AS A RATIONALE FOR THE RDP
The previous Parts have responded to the claims that Article 18
and the RDP are justified to address lock-in problems or protect the
fundamental rights of the data subject. As discussed above, there are
serious questions that a broad version of the RDP is justified under either competition or fundamental rights law. One additional argument for the RDP is that there may be reasons to support interoperability itself, apart from competition law or fundamental rights reasons.
As we have stated throughout this Essay, we support interoperability
in a wide range of settings. 264 Our understanding of Article 18, however, is that the RDP as proposed is quite different from previous legal
efforts to protect interoperability. Proponents to date have not addressed this new aspect of the RDP, which places an affirmative mandate on the first player to create an EIM, and thus differs from previous efforts to ensure that it is lawful for second players to build
products that can operate with the first player.
Apart from current doctrines of competition law or fundamental
rights, interoperability itself might be a rationale for Article 18. Some
scholars, for instance, believe that competition law currently inadequately protects against abuses from dominant networks. 265 Tim
Berners-Lee, credited with inventing the World Wide Web, 266 is a notable supporter of interoperability. By increasing data flow between
websites, he sees the potential for “unexpected, serendipitous re-use
of data, that is, when somebody uses that information for a completely
different purpose.” 267 In their 2012 book Interop, John Palfrey and Urs
Gasser write: “Interoperability should be an explicit goal in national
and international discussions of business, law, and policy because the
upsides of interoperability are massive: it fosters innovation and competition, enhances diversity, gives consumers choice, and can lead to
unexpected benefits over time.” 268 For proponents of openness in

264. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., Salil K. Mehra, Paradise Is a Walled Garden? Trust, Antitrust, and User Dynamism, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 889, 944 (2011).
266. Tim Berners-Lee, Inventor of the World Wide Web, Knighted by Queen Elizabeth II, MIT
NEWS (July 16, 2004), http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2004/berners-lee-knighted.html.
267. Sarah Powell, Guru Interview: Sir Timothy Berners-Lee, KBE, EMERALD MANAGEMENT
FIRST, at 2 (2006), http://first.emeraldinsight.com/interviews/pdf/berners-lee.pdf.
268. PALFREY & GASSER, INTEROP, supra note 61, at 8. Palfrey and Gasser emphasize
downsides as well as upsides of interoperability. Gasser & Palfrey, Breaking Down, supra
note 61, at 15–18.
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computing, interoperability is a desirable goal when it prevents social
networks such as Twitter and LinkedIn from locking in users by giving
them the right to transport their data from those networks. 269
One notable legal source that supports interoperability is the
1995 Court of Appeals for the First Circuit opinion in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International. 270 In that case, the court held that
Lotus could not use copyright to protect its menu command hierarchy—a type of interoperability information. 271 Borland was thus permitted to copy Lotus’s menu command hierarchy to build its own
spreadsheet program. 272 The case specifically interprets the U.S. copyright law in a way that prevents the first party, Lotus, from blocking
the second party, Borland. 273 The case can also be viewed as consistent with a broader message: The second party has and should have
considerable freedom to find ways to write its own code so as to promote interoperability. There is a major distinction, however, between
this freedom of the second party and the RDP. Article 18 imposes an
affirmative mandate on the first party to write the EIM. 274 This affirmative obligation on the first party is a long step past the Lotus v. Borland holding of freedom to act by the second party.
European Union law on this point is similar. The 1991 E.U.
Computer Programs Directive provides a copyright exception that allows second parties to first observe and study and then copy information necessary to achieve interoperability with the first party’s
product. 275 As described by noted copyright scholar Pamela Samuelson, U.S. and E.U. law both provide “first, that interfaces necessary to
interoperability may be unprotectable by copyright law, and secondly,
that reverse engineering of computer programs, insofar as it is necessary to discerning interface information, does not infringe software

269. PALFREY & GASSER, INTEROP, supra note 61, at 237 (discussing how social networks
restrict horizontal interoperability).
270. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
271. Id. at 815.
272. Id. at 819.
273. See id. at 819 (finding that Lotus’s menu command was uncopyrightable subject
matter and therefore Borland could copy it without infringing on Lotus’s copyright).
274. See Draft Regulation, supra note 1, at art. 18(2), at 53 (directing the first party to
provide data “without hindrance”).
275. Council Directive 91/250/EEC, supra note 29.
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copyrights.” 276 As with Lotus v. Borland, E.U. law allows the second
party to build upon interoperability information without fear of infringing on the first party’s copyrights, as long as certain provisions
are met. 277 There is currently no requirement on the first party, however, to write an EIM to help the second party create interoperability.
The concept of interoperability has an undeniable appeal: Consumers will gain the ability to do new things and send data seamlessly
to new products and services. 278 At the same time, some major market
trends suggest that consumers often prefer systems that are “walled
gardens,” with limits on interoperability. 279 Apple has achieved the
largest market capitalization in the world precisely by offering products with limited interoperability. 280 The iPhone initially allowed only
Apple-developed apps. 281 Today, its App Store places considerably
more restrictions on app developers than the competing Android operating system. 282 In another example of a walled garden, Facebook
retains restrictions on what apps are allowed on its platform. 283 These
restrictions can actually contribute to security and privacy, by reducing the risk that the apps will gain unwanted access to personal data.284
In addition, other social networks, such as Twitter and Pinterest, have
over time created Facebook apps that allow users to spread the

276. Pamela Samuelson, The Past, Present and Future of Software Copyright Interoperability
Rules in the European Union and the United States, 34 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 229, 229
(2010).
277. Council Directive 91/250/EEC, supra note 29, art. 6, at 45.
278. Cf. PALFREY & GASSER, INTEROP, supra note 61, at 237–38 (describing current interoperability cloud-based environments that allow consumers to do new things).
279. For extended discussion of walled gardens and their advantages and disadvantages, including with respect to Apple, see JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNET, AND HOW TO STOP IT 1–5 (2009).
280. Apple’s market cap in August 2010 was nearing $620 billion. Steven Russolillo,
Apple’s Market Value: To Infinity and Beyond!, WALL ST. J. MARKETBEAT (Aug. 20, 2012, 11:58
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/08/20/apples-market-value-to-infinity-andbeyond/.
281. ZITTRAIN, supra note 279, at 1–5.
282. Chuck Gray, Android VS iPhone, LIBRARYPOINT (July 19, 2012, 09:04 AM),
http://www.librarypoint.org/android_vs_iphone.
283. Facebook Platform Policies, FACEBOOK, http://developers.facebook.com/policy/ (last
visited Nov. 12, 2012).
284. See Gray, supra note 282 (noting that Apple has superior security as compared to
Android because its app restrictions cut down such risks).
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unique data compilations of those social networks through the Facebook platform. 285 These examples of consumer preference for and
competitive cooperation within walled gardens suggest caution before
enacting the RDP that uniformly imposes interoperability mandates
on both small and large providers of online services.
V. CONCLUSION
This Essay fills a surprisingly large gap in the debates about the
proposed E.U. Data Protection Regulation. The gap may exist in part
because data portability is an attractive concept—we as consumers
would like to be able to move “our” stuff from one system to another. 286 In addition, data portability is a proposed new fundamental
human right, 287 and many authors would rather support human rights
than criticize them.
The proposed Article 18, however, has serious flaws from both a
competition and privacy perspective. 288 Competition law in the E.U.
and U.S. focuses on the welfare of consumers. 289 As discussed here,
however, the proposed RDP appears to reduce consumer welfare. 290
Interoperability is often hard to achieve, and the RDP would impose
substantial costs on suppliers of software and apps, to write the software to export data from one system “without hindrance” so that the
data can be imported smoothly into a second system. 291 The costs of
this mandated code would be passed on to consumers. As a matter of
competition law, Article 18 is over-broad, applying to small enterprises, to enterprises with no monopoly power, and to markets with no
barriers to entry. 292 More generally, Article 18 conflicts with the competition law rules about exclusionary conduct; it creates a per se prohibition where competition law would apply a rule of reason approach, considering efficiencies as well as possible harm to
competition. 293
285. See, e.g., Post Your Tweets to Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://apps.facebook.com/twitter/
(last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
286. See supra note 6.
287. See supra Part III.A.
288. See supra Parts II–III.
289. See supra note 87.
290. See supra Part II.
291. See supra Part II.B.1.
292. See supra Part II.A.
293. See supra Part II.C.
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The proposed Article 18 also suffers serious difficulties as a matter of data protection law. 294 There is no well-defined or established
right to data portability—no jurisdiction has experimented with anything resembling the proposed Article 18, and the Draft Regulation
would apply the new mandates to over half a billion residents of the
European Union. 295 Article 18 is explicitly drafted under standard
legislative procedures rather than through some constitutional process, and most of the important details are delegated down even further to the Commission. 296 These sorts of bureaucratic proceedings
are not usually the source of a new fundamental human right. In addition, Article 18 poses serious risks to a long-established E.U. fundamental right of data protection: the right to security of a person’s data. 297 Previous access requests by individuals were limited in scope and
format. 298 By contrast, when an individual’s lifetime of data must be
exported “without hindrance,” then one moment of identity fraud
can turn into a lifetime breach of personal data.
As authors writing in the United States, we are not close enough
to negotiations about the Draft Regulation to know what changes may
be feasible before the Regulation becomes final. The goal instead has
been to provide a thoughtful critique of the proposal. In a final Regulation or subsequent Commission actions, we hope the competition
and privacy critique provided here can inform decisions about how to
foster the best possible information economy, for the benefit of consumers and while reducing the likelihood of unexpected and negative
consequences.

294. See supra Part III.
295. See supra Part III.
296. See supra Part III.A.
297. See supra Part III.C.
298. See supra Part III.C.

